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Toward Really Understanding Media Effects
on Advertising Response: Procedure and Evidence
The medium through which advertising information is transmitted
represents one of the most elemental dimensions of the communication
environment. Decisions on channel selection are among the most risky
of the "strategic variable" decisions facing the professional communi-
cator since substantial investments are concerned and uncertainty as to
the role of the medium in the communication process remains high. The
quantitative models which have been developed as surrogates for managerial
judgemient in combining various inputs to choose a medium will continue
to require as Integral inputs estimates concerning the effect of the
candidate media on the psychological processes which mediate changes in
consumer attitudes and intentions. The efficiency of the machine-based
models will be just as constrained by the accuracy of these estimates as
was that of their human predecessors. Ideally, such estimates would
derive from an integrated analysis which considers not only the medium
but relevant receiver and message variables, and relies heavily on
available behavioral theory for evidence about the interrelationships.
Yet basic behavioral research on communication processes has
strangely ignored the medium variable in both theory and research.
McGulre, in noting the relative scarcity of empirical evidence on channel
factors, explains somewhat obtusely that the basic theories of social
Influence have just not developed "in ways that make channel factors
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interesting (11, p. 225)." The medium is, however, potentially quite
Interesting if it is important in shaping the process through which
information exchange influences behavior. The responsibility of fillirj^
this apparent void must fall on those of us seeking to apply behavioral
theory in a problem arena where the medium is a variable which must be
dealt with.
ANALYZING MEDIA EFFECTS
Considerable evidence is available to enable media comparisons with
respect to "exposure potential" within demographically defined audience
segments (although caution must be exercised in interpreting this data).
Media can be compared on such properties as technical capabilities or
the "fit" between editorial climate and product; as Gensch's (5) review
illustrates, such judgements remain largely intuitive. On questions of
receiver responses more directly related to the persuasion process,
little is known about differential media effects. A fairly clear picture
has emerged regarding one gross modal distinction; it is veil established
that face-to-face exchange has more direct impact on attitude and behav-
ioral change than does mass-media communication. The reasons for the
relative advantage of the face-to-face channel are not as perfectly
understood. Among those suggested have been greater active receiver
participation, greater opportunity for overt commitment by the receiver,
greater opportunity for immediate strategy adjustment by the communi-
cator, greater perception of source similarity by the receiver, and
greater constraint on the receiver's selective inattention.
1
:; f
•'•''.
I
.1 '
.
:tiv
.
T.-;•-'•-
• .( M".r r •.•
'>vh;- .•
.-JU-j-j
;!'-f.::.i;:;:ii, :-.3^y<
r 1 . .-, .^ I .
•'" !.
.
!
"
.;• •-.-(
Experimental psychologists concerned with the processes of selective
attention and the interaction of sensory processing systems have begun
to examine the mode-of-transmission variable in rigorous laboratory
experiments which reduce the communication situation to a level quite
removed from complex social communication (e.g., 10, 17). This work has
not been concerned with evaluative responses to the incoming information,
and, although selective attention is certainly relevant in the study of
advertising breakdown, the research has not yet been integrated into the
areas of social and mass communication.
In attitude change research, the mode of message transmission has
been treated very unsystematically. The assumption behind this lack of
experimental control has apparently been that modality differences have
no important effect on the processes underlying attitudinal acceptance of
information. The recent interest in the effects of "distraction" during
presentation of a persuasive message would appear to focus research
attention on channel effects since distraction implies multi-channel
information streams. However, studies on distraction have interchanged
channels just as freely as attitude change studies using other independent
variables. In illustration, distraction studies have been reported using
audio "messages" and visual "distractions" (1, 3), print "messages" and
audio "distractions" (14), audio "messages" and audio "distractions" (16),
and even a print "message" with competing information in the form of tastes
and odors (7).
A receiver's experience when confronted with a stream of audio
information may be quite different from that when confronted with a print
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message. In analyzing this experience it is necessary to define the
information-handling tasks facing the receiver. He must attend to and
classify the incoming message, respond cognitively to that message content,
attend to and classify other available information, and respond to that
also. Of course what constitutes the "message" and what the "other" infor-
mation is decided by the receiver, not the communicator. Each of the tasks
cited will compete for a share of the individual's total cognitive capa-
city, and his strategy for accomplishing them efficiently should depend
on both his motivation and his capacity to engage in active information-
processing. Krugman (8) has suggested that audio transmission is charac-
terized by an uncontrollable rate of stimulation while with print the
pace of exposure is controlled by the receiver. l"Jhen stimulation rate
is not controllable, little opportunity would exist for allocation among
the competing tasks outlined above by such devices as rereading or pausing
to critically contemplate on a point. In such a case, all of the tasks
must suffer somewhat with some perhaps being affected more than others.
In one of the few formal discussions of media, Krugman argues that
the print medium may be inherently more involving than audio or audio-
visual media. This contention remains to be convincingly demonstrated,
and the idea should receive critical appraisal before it becomes pre-
maturely entrenched in the marketing literature. Involvement has been
treated to various interpretations (4, 12, 15, 19), but the concept of
motivational arousal has been a common ingredient. In supporting his
model, Krugman' s early research relied on a variable called a "connection"
as a criterion. A connection was defined as any spontaneous bridging
between the stimulus message and the receiver's personal life, as
L.i
expressed in his immediate post-exposure thoughts. Print transmission die
tend to evoke a greater level of connections than audio-visual. The
explanation for this does not necessarily involve "involvement" (arousal),
however, but the relative effects of the two modes on the receiver's
capacity to respond at all. The medium may operate as a constraint on
information processing capacity (by easing or increasing the load per
unit time to be handled) but this is distinct from operating on cognitive
arousal. Further, audio-visual (television) messages differ from print
not only with respect to exposure rate but in the number of tasks offered
(an audio plus a visual information stream). Thus it is unclear which
property might have constrained the response level. Later research (9)
using brain-waves, a more valr.d criterion of arousal, has been incon-
clusive.
A person's involvement in processing the information available to
him in the immediate environment is a function of his recognition that
the information has goal-satisfaction value to him. These goals may be
enduring or situatlonally salient but arousal to process information
depends largely on the perceived nature of the specific information .
Thus it is quite possible to have highly arousing information flows trans-
mitted through a medium xjhich restricts the receiver's capacity for response,
and conversely situations less restrictive in their effect on capacity
which are not at all arousing. It is thus realistic to predict that the
modality of the message and the receiver's involvement in processing the
specific content will interact to shape the nature of the receiver's
response function. This interactive relationship would be more congruent
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with the accumulated research on attitude change processes vjhich ler.:^s us
to expect complex interactive relationships among the impoitcnt variables
rather than generalized main effects.
If the argument of an interactive relationship is valid, level of
information processinj will vary as a joint function of the information
mode and the informational content. We will further argue then that
processing involvement will tend to have c larger variance across messages in
the print medium than in the audio mediuni. That is, arousal will fluctuate
within a more narrow set of limits in the audio mode. Consider a message
containing information which itself is not very involving to the receiver.
The opportunity for that receiver to avoid engaging in any active process-
ing is much greater when the message is in print than when it's in audio.
In print communication one can turn to another more involving piece of
information without leaving the medium; in audio communication this is not
the case. The stimulus still intrudes upon one's senses and cone process-
ing may take place. The lower limit is thus lower for print than for
audio messages. Conversely, if processing-involvement operates in a "rever-
berating" manner, feeding on itself as the receiver's mind links tho infor-
mation to the value system which in turn stimulates other associations
related to these values, then an initiilly involving message may culminate
in greater overall arousal when it is in 7vint than in audio. Here the
rate-of-exposure feature becomes relevant, since the c- oration of this
reverberating process is limited by time available. We would therefore
expect that the effect of informational involvement differences on
responses will be more dramatic within the print mediun than within the
V: r"' ' :"
audio medium. As opposed to a general "high" or "low" processing involve-
ment model, the more appropriate model would be a "wide band" (print) and
"narrow band" (audio) model. Such a model accommodates the interaction
of medium properties with the properties of the medium content. It is
more realistic than either the implicit model adopted by most attitude
change researchers (all media equivalent) or that proposed by McLuhan
and Krugman (media effects on behavior can be analyzed in isolation of
specific media informational content).
EFFECTS ON COGNITIVE RESPONSES
How may these variables be expected to influence consumer response
to advertising in a given situation? It is important to focus the
analysis on responses which are central to consumer attitude change. A
number of responses have been proposed as mediators of an individual's
attitudinal acceptance of the message. "Attention" is assumed to be a
necessary initiating process. Until recently "comprehension" was consid-
ered to be a second important intervening response. Comprehension should
imply a sharing of meaning between communicator and receiver, which pre-
supposes that these parties agree beforehand on the significance of the
symbols used. The treatment of comprehension, both conceptually and
operationally, in research on attitude change has generally lost this
essential notion of shared meaning, however, and is in need of reevalu-
ation. Greenwald (6) has recently proposed that the spontaneous cognitive
responses activated as the receiver attempts to relate the incoming
information to what he already knows and feels constitute the major
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mediator of information acceptance. The strong linkage between such
responses and post -communication predispositions has been demonstrated
in advertising (18) and non-advertising situations (6).
Within the array of thoughts activated in reaction to the adver-
tising message, it is possible to identify conceptually distinct modes
of response which may be treated as variables. Among the nore important
modes are counterargument , support argument and source discou-.ting . To
predict the effect of the medium and informational involvement variables
on attitudinal acceptance, it is first necessary to determine how they
will affect these separate responses which shape the attitudinal outcome.
We are concerned with how variations in a consumer's motivation and
capacity to process the information will affect his generation of counter-
arguments, support arguments, and source discounting. These tasks may
be expected to require different levels of cognitive exertion. Counter-
argument will require considerable receiver input since the receiver must
compare the arguments presented, which may be many and new, to relevant
beliefs within his existing belief system. The internal evidence he must
call on to discredit the message arguments may be "scattered" within his
own mental structure, rather prominently available for instant activation.
Support arguments should require less effort to generate. The message
content itself provides these, so that the decoding and support argument
processes are quite complementary. Source evaluation will be comparatively'
effortless since only a single readily available response to a single
element of the information is necessary. Of course, this will depend to
some extent on whether the source is identifiable and easily valenced.
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It is predicted therefore that support argument and source discounting
will be influenced primarily by factors affecting the receiver's capacity
for response. Counterargument, since it is a more difficult task, should
in addition be significantly affected by motivational factors. The pre-
diction is therefore that print presentation will tend to increase the
generation of support arguments and source derogations relative to audio,
with acute information involvement having little effect. Counterargument
generation should follow the interaction pattern proposed earlier. When
information processing involvement is high, counterargument should be
greater with print transmission; when involvement is low, it should be
less with print transmission.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Subjects
Subjects for this study were 165 adult women drawn from the member-
ships of various church and social organizations in the central Pennsyl-
vania area. The study was described in all contacts with group leaders
or members, as concerned with mass media communication and conducted under
the auspices of the Center for Research at the Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity. There was no mention of advertising, marketing, or business
administration. Subjects ranged in age from 26 to 53. The women com-
prising this subject pool were very heterogeneous with respect to their
educational, occupational, and social class backgrounds. Compensation
for participation was made to the groups rather than to individuals.
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Experimental Communications
The topic of the experimental advertisement was a product called
"Synthetic Meals," a line of food products made from soybeans and soybean
derivatives. This product, although technically hypothetical, was
selected after extensive pretesting had established that it met certain
criteria judged important in producing a fair and reasonable test of the
research hypotheses. Pretesting with similar subjects had shown that
the product was characterized by a pre -experimental range of attitudinal
positions across individual women, absence of a marked negative or posi-
tive bias, a reasonable level of inherent interest, and a moderate degree
of newness. Regarding the product's newness, it was found that the product
was not felt to be unexpected or discontinuous ly innovative (somewhat
similar products exist). The product has added interest as a research
topic because it represents a potential solution to an important social
problem.
The experimental advertising message contained six arguments in favor
of adopting the product. Briefly, the arguments were: that the product
is comparable in taste to natural foods, that the product provides nutri-
tive balance which the typical family meal may lack, that preparation of
this product is more trustworthy than packing of natural foods, that the
product can aid in weight -control for children, that natural foods may
be polluted, and that the price of natural foods is rising. Reading time
for the Print version was approximately 1-2 minutes. Playing time for
the Audio version was 1 minute, 10 seconds. The Audio version was
taped by a professional radio announcer using the station's facilities.
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The text of both Audio and Print versions was, of course, Identical. In
order to simulate as far as possible the natural conditions in which
people encounter advertising messages, the experimental advertisement
was presented in the midst of surrounding "editorial" matter. This
consisted of an excerpt from a national magazine feature, logically
adaptable to both print and radio presentation, which preceded the
advertisement. This was done to enhance the impression, created by the
introduction, that the entire communication was an excerpt taken at
random from the mass media, and as a control for artificial stimulation
of response to the ad. The editorial passage evoked no responses related
to the product nor any overt emotional responses in pretest interviews.
The editorial matter was 182 words in length; the advertising message
was 192 words long.
Procedure
Experimental sessions were conducted in assembly rooms in the home
city of the subject. Subjects were randomly assigned to the four experi-
mental treatments as specified by the 2X2 crossed factorial design.
The subjects in a particular cell (final cell size of 40) were processed
in groups of five or less. Naive experimental assistants monitored each
session. All remarks made by the assistants were read directly from a
prepared script. Subjects were seated so as to preclude chances for
visual or verbal interaction.
The introduction described the study as concerned with people's
normal reaction to mass media communications. Subjects were told they
would be presented an excerpt from a national magazine or radio show
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consisting of a regular feature story and an advertisement. Forewarning
of the general nature of the communication was felt to be desirable in
that people typically are aware of the general nature of what they will
encounter in mass media exposures.
The decision involvement manipulation was accomplished by instruct-
ing subjects in the "High Decision Involvement" treatment that they could
expect to make a short-run decision about the product appearing in the
impending advertisement. The relevance of this decision in terms of
their families, their own time and effort, and their personal finances
were emphasized. Subjects in the "Low Decision Involvement" treatment
received no such instruction.
Subjects were asked to approach the entire communication in a
natural manner. They were told that there was "no particular need to
memorize." Pretest subjects had revealed that they found themselves
trying to memorize the message content in a manner they felt to be
atypical of their natural reading or listening style. Because this
singular attention to rate-memorization might have interfered with the
spontaneity of subjects' cognitive responses, it was deemed advisable
to dampen this unnatural memorization urge.
Subjects were then exposed to the experimental communication.
Immediately after communication exposure, subjects were given booklet B
which contained the Cognition Listing dependent measures. Subjects then
turned to Booklet C which contained the remainder of the dependent mea-
sures. Subjects were informed there was no time limit for Booklet C.
They were asked to work straight through the booklet to the end. Order
:t ;!!;•
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of presentation of the dependent measures In Booklet C was: attitudinal
acceptance measures, reception measures, cognition weighting, cognition
origin. Completion of Booklet C took approximately 25 minutes. Running
time for the entire experiment was approximately 35-40 minutes.
Dependent Measures
Cognition Listing
The Cognition Listing measure was contained completely in Booklet
B. As discussed earlier, this task was unexpected as a control against
an artificial response set. Subjects were instructed to list any and
all thoughts relevant to the product Synthetic Meals or to the advertis-
ing message which had occurred to them during exposure or which occurred
to them now. They were instructed to ignore spelling, punctuation, and
grammer since cognition content, not cognition form, was of primary
interest. In order to facilitate coding, subjects were asked to use a
separate line for each separate thought. Directly beneath the instruc-
tions were 18 horizontal lines stretching the width of the paper about
% inch apart.
Attitudinal Acceptance
The first item used to measure attitudinal message acceptance con-
sisted of elicitating the response of the subject to the statement, "The
arguments about the Synthetic Meals product contained in the advertise-
ment were very convincing." The focus of this measure was on the product
dimensions covered in the communication ; it will be labeled A . Subjects
aywY"^
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responded on a six-point scale with each point labeled as to degree of
agreement. Labels ranged from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree."
The second measure of attitudinal acceptance consisted of subject
response to the questions, "How do you yourself feel about the product
Synthetic Meals?" The focus was on overall attitude toward the product
(A^) . The response-scale consisted of 26 dots spaced 1/8 inch apart.
Endpoints of this scale line were labeled, "I like it very much" and "I
don't like it at all." Subjects circled the dot which best designated
their feeling on the question. In order to determine the effect of the
message on behavioral tendencies, a measure of buying intention (BI) was
used as a surrogate for actual purchase behavior. Subjects responded to
the question, "Will you purchase the Synthetic Meals product when it
becomes available in your local area?" Subjects responded on a five-
point scale with each point labeled. Labels ranged from "definitely
will" to "definitely won't." This measure was taken at the end of
Booklet C; it therefore came approximately 20 minutes after the first
two measures.
Reception
Subjects were asked on an open-ended question to reproduce as many
of the arguments included in the advertising message as they could.
This measure was viewed as more integrally related to post-communication
attitude formation than the second measure. A second measure of recep-
tion consisted of a number of multiple-choice questions about specific
points in the advertising message.
' f'
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Measurement of Cognition Weights
Subjects were asked to rate each separate thought they had recorded
earlier on the Cognition Listing measure with respect to its importance
to them in forming an opinion about the Synthetic Meals product. This
rating was accomplished by having the subject place a number correspond-
ing to perceived level of importance beside each thought at the edge of
the Cognition Listing measure. A rating of "1" was assigned if the
thought was "extremely important;" a rating of "2" if the thought was
"moderately important;" a rating of "3" if the thought was "slightly
important .
"
Measurement of Perceived Cognition Origin
Subjects were asked to evaluate each separate thought recorded
earlier on the Cognition Listing measure according to its perceived
origin. If the subject felt that the thought had originated directly
in the advertising message, she labeled it with an A. If she felt the
thought had been a reaction by her to something stated directly in the
advertisement, she labeled it with a B. If the subject felt the thought
was one that she had originated and was not a reaction to something
directly stated in the advertisement, she labeled it C.
Coding of Cognition-Listing Protocols
Three members of the editorial staff of the Journal of Marketing
served as protocol judges.
The scoring convention adopted by this study was as follows: the
basis for final rating of each cognition was the modal rating of the
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three judges. If 2 of the 3 judges agreed in rating a cognition, that
rating was assigned to the cognition. Unanimous agreement among the
judges were achieved on 76.77o of the cognitions. Two of the three judges
agreed on 22% of the cognitions. Thus, the modal convention resulted in
assignment of a rating of 98.7% of the cases on the initial attempt. Only
12 of the 913 cognitions drew initial disagreement among all three judges
-
These 12 cognitions were presented to the same panel of judges for rejudging.
Judges were not told what the ratings in the first attempt had been. Ratings
were achieved for all but two of the cognitions on the second trial. Both
of the unrated cognitions belonged to the same subject's protocol; that
subject's data was consequently eliminated from the study.
An analysis of variance was performed on the first set of cognition
ratings to provide an estimate of the inter-judge reliability in assign-
ing category scores to a subject. A separate analysis was conducted
for three different cognitive-response categories of importance to the
study: cognitive counterarguments, cognitive support arguments, and
cognitive source derogations.
The inter-judge reliability in assigning subject's counterargument
scores was .957. The inter- judge reliability in assigning support
argument scores was .898. The inter- judge reliability in assigning
source derogation scores was .959. These coefficients provide evidence of
high reliability in the coding of experimental protocols. Taking this
evidence together with that provided by the high percentage of unanimous
cognition ratings, the use of judges working within a framework of
rigorous theoretical category definitions was accepted as a valid method
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for the extraction of cognitive response variables from spontaneous,
unstructured subject protocols.
ANALYSIS
Verification of the Decision Involvement Manipulation
In order to substantiate empirically that two distinct levels of
decision involvement has been created, subjects were asked about the
distribution of their attention during exposure to the communication.
They responded to the question, "Which part of the communication did you
concentrate on most?" on a five point bipolar scale with endpoints
labeled "I concentrated most on the story" and "I concentrated most on
the advertisement". The mean response for Low Decision Involvement
subjects was 2.53 and that for High Decision Involvement subjects was
3.48 (a higher score indicates relatively more attention focused on the
advertisement). Not only were these means significantly different
(F = 19.37, p< .001), they fell on opposite sides of the scale midpoint.
This was satisfying from the standpoint of experimental validity. Those
women in the natural exposure conditions devoted relatively more atten-
tion to the editorial matter, while those in the heightened involvement
conditions did just the opposite.
Total Cognitive Activity
It was predicted that the environment in which exposure takes place
influences the capacity of the receiver for spontaneous response to the
message. General level of cognitive response is of interest here rather
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than any specific type of response. Results of the analysis using abso-
lute number of codable responses as the dependent measure appear in
Table 1. The print mode of presentation evoked significantly greater
total response than the audio presentation (p < .004). The proposal
that the uncontrollable exposure rate characteristic of the audio mode
restricts an individual's ability to generate cognitive responses to the
message is supported. l-Jhile heightened involvement in processing the
advertising message failed to significantly increase total response
levels, the means were in the expected direction.
Cognitive Counterargument
The analysis now turns to the effects of the experimental variables
on specific types of spontaneous responses which have been shown to be
potentially important mediators of advertising effectiveness. Table 2
shows that level of counterargument was significantly greater among the
women who were acutely involved with evaluation of the advertising infor-
mation than among those who were less involved (p < .055). Differences in
mode of presentation had no noticeable main effect on the counterargument
levels, but interestingly the predicted interaction effect proved to be
significant (p<.04).
The sources of both the main effect of decision involvement and the
interaction effect become clear from an examination of the cell means.
The results of the ANOVA are overwhelmingly attributable to differences
in counterargument occuring within the print mode treatment. IThen the
advertisement was audio, individuals were able to engage in approximately
equal amounts of counterargument regardless of acute involvement. When
exposed to the print message, however, those women at a high level of
decision involvement engaged in considerably more counterargument (twice
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as much) than those at the lower level (t = 2.88, p < .05). The pattern
of observed cell means conforms to that predicted for counterargument by
the "wide-narrow band" model. When acute incentive to critically process
the message was not high, the women receiving the print version were more
successful than their audio version counterparts in disengaging from the
exertion of counterarguing . When incentive to process was significantly
higher, the print group could produce more counterarguments than the
audio group.
An Alternate Mode of Cognit ive Res istance; Source Derogation
As discussed earlier, another cue which i^ay be used for active defense
against persuasion is a source-derogation. Separate coding categories were
established for counterarguments and source derogations. The advantages
of the direct measure of spontaneous source derogation used in this study
over conventional measures should be noted. Typical post-hoc measures
request the subject to evaluate uhe message source on several rating
scales. A real question arises po to xjbsther a source-oriented cognitive
strategy had been utilized Ly the Pubjaci: naturally or whether the direct
question itself stimulated belated source derogation. Since no direct
mention of the message source (or any other message property) is made
on the cognition-listing measure usc^d here, when a vroman did record a
thought derogating the source of Information it is quite probable that
this type of response has r.ctualiy occurred spontaneously. As we will
see, our increased faith in the spontaneity of this response will be
important in enabling us to understand the receiver's other responses
to advertising.
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Miller and Baron (13) worry that separate coding of counterarguments
and source derogations might be difficult. No evidence of such an ambi-
guity was found in this study. In post-coding interviews the protocol
judges expressed the opinion that, given the framework of theoretical
coding definitions, distinguishing between the two types of cues had
posed no problem. The high reliability coefficients obtained for these
variables support this.
The analysis of source-derogation data is presented in Table 3.
Both of the situational variables produced main effects significant at
conservative probability levels. As predicted, women receiving the audio
message generated less source derogation than those getting the message
in print (p <.03). Unexpectedly, women at the higher level of informa-
tional involvement generated significantly less spontaneous source
derogation than women at the lower level (p < .001). In comparing these
results with the analysis of counterargument data, a dramatic contrast
of cognitive resistance tactics becomes apparent. Heightened decision
involvement enhances counterargument relative to natural involvement;
this pattern reverses itself for source derogations. Taken together,
the two sets of data provide strong evidence that individual consumers
adopt quite different cognitive defense strategies depending upon their
perceptions of the relevance of an advertisement to their informational
needs. This divergence is, of course, relative and it would be misleading
to characterize either condition in the study solely in terms of one resistance
strategy or the other. Maxinum source derogation occurred under conditions
where counterargument were minimal.
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Support Argument
Table 4 contains the analysis of the support argument data. The
analysis shows a significant main effect of modality (F = 11.35, p <.001)
with presentation of the message via the print mode enhancing the level
of support arguments generated by the receivers. No evidence that involve-
ment level had an important effect on support argument scores was obtained.
Internal analysis revealed that, while the difference between the two modes
is more pronounced when involvement was low, level of support argument
is significantly higher under print transmission for both high and low
involvement (p < .05).
Attitudinal Acceptance of the Advertising Message
Having demonstrated that message modality and decision involvement
were important situational variables in determining the nature of an indi-
vidual's spontaneous cognitive responses to an advertising stimulus, it
remains to show how the effects of these variables can be observed on
attitudinal indices. Three dependent measures are available for this
analysis. These measures were operationally described earlier but the
theoretical distinction between them should be made clear. Attitude
c
measures the individual's evaluation of the product -re levant content of
the message. This measure recognizes that a single message cannot contain
information on every product dimension that an individual finds relevant,
and that one proper measure of message influence focuses strictly on the
product as defined only by the information in the message. The measure
used is a summary of this message-specific impact.
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Attitude represents the traditional measure of affect for the global
product. The attitude object here is much broader than in the previous
measure. The third measure taps behavioral intentions toward the object,
or more specifically, intentions to perform a specific behavior under
defined conditions. Thus the referent for this measure is even more removed,
in terms of the set of relevant cognitive considerations, from the infor-
mation contained in the message than either of the other measures.
The analysis using each of these measures is presented in Tables 5,
6, and 7. As is apparent, no statistically reliable effects were found
when the dependent measure was Attitude^, or Attitude^. The purchase
intentions measure did however uncover a statistically significant main
effect, with subjects exposed to the print version of the advertisement
being more inclined than their audio version counterparts to buy the new
product when it was available. (F = 14.45, p< .05).
A natural question arising from this analysis would be "l-Jhat's going
on here? VThy are the dramatic effects of modality and involvement obvious
in the cognitive response data not generally mirrored in additudinal out-
come data? I'Thy does one outcome measure detect relationships that others
don't?" The following analysis, which portrays quite clearly the complexity
of communication processes involving multiple mediators, will answer these
questions and should provide much insight into the paths which future
research in communication and persuasion must take.
Tracing the Process Across Mediators
It is reasonable to expect that a variable proposed as a mediator of
some effect should parallel the results obtained on the criterion outcome
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in both pattern and intensity. This expectation does not appear confirmed
in this study until it is recognized that the cognitive cues represent
a set of mediators each of which is more or less operative in a given
situation . The pattern of attitude scores should not therefore strictly
reflect treatment effects for any single mediator but the composite effects
found when the appropriate combination of mediators is analyzed .
If predictions of post -communication attitude were to be based on any
single mediator, it would be cognitive counterargument. This variable was
clearly more strongly related to attitude than support argument and source
derogation in this study (18). Significant involvement and interaction
effects were found on counterargument, however, and no comparable effects
emerged on any of the three attitude measures. Does this contradict the
correlational analysis and imply that counterargument really isn't an
important mediator? Not when it is remembered that other cues were also
shown to contribute toward explanation of attitudinal variance, and that
these cues, when integrated with counterargument may nullify or rearrange
the treatment effects substantially.
To demonstrate this, integrational indices have been created based
on linear combinations of the sets of mediating cues shown to be appro-
priate for each attitudinal criterion. These new variables were entered
into the analysis of variance and the results are presented in Tables
8 and 9. Working backwards through the criterions affords the clearest
organization of the data. Previous analysis had shown that only two of
the mediators were important in explaining Buying Intentions; derogation
of the message source was not operative when a specific act toward the
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product was the focus of the subject's response. Table 8 shows what
happens when this two-variable model is analyzed for treatment effects.
The model presented is one in which the individual responses have been
weighted by the subjective importance assigned to them by the subjects.
It has been shown that these weights give a close approximation of the
natural weights which would be assigned to the mediators on the basis of
a multiple regression analysis. It is possible of course to apply the
beta-weights from the within-treatment multiple regression analysis as
weighting factors in deriving these integrational indices. There are
problems however in using beta-coefficients obtained from the same sample
as valid weights within that sample. The weighting would in any case be
approximate; such a weighting of the current data was performed and the
analysis of indices derived from that showed no substantive departures
from that presented here.
When both counterargument and support argument are considered in the
dependent index, a significant modality effect is found (F = 4.82, p<.03),
with the print advertisement producing a more positive net response than
the audio. Lo and behold, this finding matches that obtained for the
Buying Intention measure. In addition internal analysis of the pattern
of means reveals that the differences among the experimental cells are
identical; in both cases the print mode, high involvement group of women
were significantly more positive than either audio group (p <.05), but
not significantly different from the print mode, low involvement group
(for the integrational index, t = 1.83, p <,08).
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But what about the lack of significant effects in the analysis of
Attitude or Attitude ' ^°'>^ these two variables, all three cognitive
c p
response mediators had been found to contribute significantly to the
explained variance. Consequently an integrational index was computed
incorporating each of the three mediators, again weighted by the subjec-
tive importance term. The influence of the source derogation mediator
can now be clearly seen (Table 9). Since source derogation had been
substantially greater aaang the subjects receiving the print advertise-
ment, the effect of its inclusion as a mediator is to compress the between-
treatment mean differences. The modal effect disappears (F = 2.99, p< .09)
as it had for attitudinal measures Attitude^, and Attitudep. The pattern
of means for the three-variable index remains similar to that for both
Attitude and Attitude but the cell differences have been sufficiently
c p
dampened by the source derogation variable to decrease the statistical
reliability of the relationships.
In summary, the experimental treatments were found to have significant
main and interaction effects on the individual cognitive mediators. These
effects were, however, markedly different across the mediators. Since
several of the mediators operated in unison to shape post -communication
attitude, it was necessary to determine the appropriate combination of
mediators relevant to each of three theoretically dissimilar post-
communication attitudinal indices through separate analysis, and to derive
integrational models which captured the compensatory or bolstering effects
of the interaction of mediators within experimental cells. When this was
done, it was found that effects of medium and decision involvement on
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attitudinal acceptance did mirror the effects on the cognitive response
mediators
,
Message Comprehension
As previously noted, several attitude change models place a heavy
explanatory burden on message comprehension. Unfortunately even the
sponsors of these models have relied on simple retention measures in
operationalizing the concept. Two standard retention measures were taken:
a free-recall and an objective aided-choice measure. Analysis of this
data is presented in Tables 10 and 11. No discernible treatment effects
were discovered.
Other data which may be more pertinent to message comprehension are
available however. Subjects indicated their own perception of the origin
of each of their thoughts (advertising originated, recipient modified,
recipient generated) and analysis of treatment effects within these
perceived-origin classes was performed. The results for the "advertising
originated" class are particularly relevant. Since the message was one-
sided all of these responses were necessarily positive, and the dependent
variable was in effect the subjects' supporting arguments which she viewed
as having been initiated by the advertisement. The analysis (Table 12)
shows that print presentation resulted in significantly more such responses
than did audio (F = 8.55, p <.004). A similar effect was also found, of
course, where the dependent variable was amount of support argument regard-
less of origin. Inspection of the subjects' protocols revealed that
thoughts representing paraphrases of message arguments made up a large
-jrif'':;
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subset of all support arguments. These two results may therefore be inter-
preted as evidence that the print medium facilitated message comprehension.
The conception of message comprehension in persuasion theory needs
revision. Comprehension from the receiver's perspective implies having
made the information meaningful by relating it to her existing concepts
and beliefs. Recall-based measures do not validly tap this quality of
meaningful comprehension. The recall measure basically asks the respondent
to describe the communication itself. Storing information about the mes-
sage which was just available in short-term memory may be quite different
from meaningful comprehension of it, and in any case, beliefs about the
communication itself are relevant only to subsequent behavior toward that
communication, not toward its topic. Hence the lack of evidence support-
ing the learning (recall) - attitude relationship. The cognitive response
measurement procedure used here may be a more sensitive and valid indicant
of meaningful comprehension. This possibility is worth exploring in future
research. Such a measure would still fall short of teasing out the degree
of shared meaning between the sender and the receiver but this is extra-
ordinarily complex and may not really be appropriate. After all, whether
the meaning understood is equivalent to that 'ntended is important only
to the communicator. To the receiver, whatever is understood is what may
contribute in shaping attitudes, and, in explaining the receiver's behavior,
his perspective is the one to take.
DISCUSSION
Variation in the medium of presentation of the advertisement was system-
atically related to the consumer's total cognitive activity, support argument
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activity, source derogation activity, and, in interaction with the decision
involvement variable, counterargument activity. A reasonable conclusion
must be that the print mode of presentation differs substantially from the
audio mode in terms of the extent and nature of the evaluative cognitive
responses it elicits. Taken together with an earlier complementary analysis
(18) which demonstrated that the weighting of the mediators was influenced
by message modality, these results uould seem to point to the desirability
of formal treatment of media factors in future communication theory. The
data further suggest that variations in a receiver's involvement with the
specific message also have an influence on cognitive responses. Consumers
at an advanced stage in their decision-making with respect to a product
tend to process pertinent advertising information differently than do those
with little acute incentive to respond.
One important insight is that both resistive classes of responses
reflected sensitivity to differences in consumer information-processing
arousal while the supportive mode of response did not. Resistive cognitive
activity is therefore seen to be a function not only of the receiver's
capacity to engage in extensive response but also the receiver's acute
motivation to engage in critical reaction. Supportive activity appeared
to be primarily a function of general response capacity.
Both the theoretical model developed to acconanodate medium-content
interaction and the equally important perspective on the nature of the
respective responses mediating attitude change were generally supported.
The one unexpected finding concerned the situational interchanging of
resistance modes. Critical analysis and rebuttal of message arguments
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appears to be a preferred evaluative tactive when the receiver is suffi-
ciently aroused to try it. When no particular arousal Is present, the
receiver attempts to substitute a judgement of source attributes.
It is important to note that this increased propensity to emit source-
discounting responses when arousal is low is not necessarily accompanied
by a heavy reliance on those responses in modifying attitudes. In examining
the relative weighting of the response cues as mediators of attitudes,
counterargument remained as the dominant cue in that condition which found
subjects emitting a minimum of counterargument and a maximum of source
derogation. The women apparently still regarded the source derogations
as poor substitutes for message evaluations. The generation of cues will
tend to be a function of their availability. The usage of the cues will,
however, have evolved from learning which cues were most reliable in
serving the individual's needs for critical monitoring of information and
readjustment of beliefs in similar situations in the past.
The Procedure for Predicting Advertising Effects
One of the most enduring lessons to be learned from this study concerns
the requirements for prediction and interpretation of communication effects.
Models of the mass-media communication process must seek to formally accom-
modate the operation of multiple cognitive mediators of communication
acceptance. This is unfortunate from the standpoint of a parsimonious
theory of attitude dynamics, but the measurement procedure and the cogni-
tive response variables developed in this study may offer a basis for
systematic investigation of more complex models. If this study had relied
solely on attitudinal outcome indices as dependent measures of effect, a
i . .r, fir:-
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foreseeable conclusion would have been that nothing much happened to the
persuasion process as a result of the media and involvement variations
imposed on the advertising presentation. However, the spontaneous measures
revealed that highly meaningful behavioral differences had taken place
across the experimental conditions. One extremely important insight is
gained from the finding that when the subjects integrated these cognitive
mediators, ostensibly similar post -communication attitudinal effects
resulted (Attitude and Attitude ) across cells even though the nature of
the integration differed markedly within cells. The women arrived at the
same apparent outcome through different paths . We cannot help but wonder
In dismay about the number of attitude change studies which have been
discarded because the outcome measures which failed to detect statistically
significant associations masked other important response activity.
In order to systematize our ability to make efficient predictions
about the effect of any strategic or environmental variable on attitudinal
acceptance of marketing communications, a stage-wise procedure is suggested.
The framework for this estimation procedure is a general model linking
attitudinal outcome to mediating cues (A = w M-, + w. M^ + w, M- + > • -^^ M )
and a set of variables describing the environment of interest (receiver
segment, medium, message, source). (1) The relative importance of the
cognitive mediators (the w ) operating in the environment of interest must
be estimated. Such an analysis may use as evidence weights derived from
subjective ratings of spontaneous responses by appropriate subjects or from
multiple regression analysis. Since it appears that diverse types of cues
do operate simultaneously, it is doubtful that intuitive notions of cue
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weightlng will be consistently accurate (until sufficient research is done
to enable development of a theory of cue weighting); (2) The expected
effects of the situational variables on the activation of each of these
separate types of mediating cues (the M ) must then by analyzed; and (3)
these independent effects combined according to the appropriately weighted
integratlonal model.
This should yield a prediction about the resulting attitudinal out-
come. If direct measures of the mediating cues are taken, the location
of errors in the estimations at each stage can be detected. Thus not only
should initial hypotheses prove more accurate but the frustrating post-hoc
guessing game about explanations for unexpected or non-significant findings
will be alleviated. Although this approach appears necessary if predic-
tions of communication effects are to become precise and interpretable,
its efficacy is limited by our ability to perform each of the steps. The
attitude change research tradition has not focused on the mediating cues
in investigating relationships, and consequently provides little theoretical
insight relevant to steps 1 and 2 at this point in time. The current
research provides some initial evidence on these questions, and there is
scattered evidence available concerning the relationship of several inde-
pendent variables to counterargument generation.
This paper has made two proposals relative to the future directions
of advertising research. One of these concerned the formal treatment of
the medium as a variable, and the other outlined a more complex but neces-
sary approach to attitude change research focusing on the mediating cues.
Leo Bogart has observed "The twilight areas of advertising research are
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precisely those of social psychology in general Progress in advertising
research will rarely be in advance of our general understanding of such
subjects as the learning process, perception, motivation (2, p. 6)."
There is no reason why applied research cannot contribute at both levels.
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TABLE 1
Mean Total Cognitive Activity Scores
MODE DECISION INVOLVEMENT
Audio
Zsinl.
Total
High
3.075
4.125
3.600
Low
3.025
3.400
3.212
Total
3.050
3.762
Source
Analysis of Variance: Mean Total Cognitive
Activity Scores
MODE
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT
INTERACTION
ERROR
SS df
20.306 1
6 . 006 1
4.556 1
371.725 156
MS
20.306 8.52 .004
6.006 2.52 .114
4.556 1.91 .169
2.383
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TABLE 2
Mean Cognitive Counterargument Scores
MODE DECISION INVOLVEMENT
Audio
Print
Total
High
1.225
1.600
1.412
Low
1.250
.825
1.037
Total
1.237
1.212
Analysis of Variance: Cognitive Counterargument
Scores
Source SS df MS
MODE .025 1 .025 .017 .897
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT 5.625 1 5.625 3.785 .054
INTERACTION 6.400 1 6.400 4.306 .040
ERROR 231.850 156 1.486
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MODE
Audio
Print
Total
TABLE 3
Mean Cognitive Source Derogation Scores
High
.100
.325
.212
DECISION INVOLVEMENT
hSai Total
.305
.200
.525
.423
.412
Analysis of Variance: Source Derogation Scores
Source SS df MS F p
MODE 2.025 1 2.025 4.879 0.029
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT 1.600 I 1.600 3.855 0.001
INTERACTION 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 1.000
ERROR 64.750 156 0.415
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''''l . !
.:;^r'
JK. V
.
MODE
Audio
Print
Total
TABLE 4
Mean Cognitive Support Argument Scores
High
.625
1.150
.887
DECISION INVQLVF.MRTJT
Low Total
.525
.575
1-375 1.262
.958
Source
Analysis of Variance: Cognitive Support Argument
Scores
SS
MODE 18.906 1
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT
.156 1
INTERACTION 1.056 1
ERROR 259.825 156
MS
18.906 11.351
.156
1.056
1.665
.094
.634
.001
.760
.427
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TABLE 5
Mean Score on Attitude,
MODE DECISION INVOLVEMENT
Audio
Print
Total
High
3.200
3.050
3.165
Low
2.900
3.550
3.225
Total
3.050
3.300
Analysis of Variance: Attitude
Source SS df MS
MODE 2.500 1 2.500 1.115 .293
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT .400 1 .400 .178 .673
INTERACTION 6.400 1 6.400 2.854 .093
ERROR 349.800 156 2.242

MODE
Audio
Print
Total
TABLE 6
Mean S^core on Att:itude
P
DECISION INVOLVEMENT
High Low Total
9.075 8.525 8.800
9.850 10.070 10.275
9.462 9.612
Analysis of Variance: Attitude
Source SS
MODE 87.025
df
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT 0.900 1
INTERACTION 19.600 1
ERROR 7884.250 156
MS
87.025
0.900
19.600
56.540
F
1.722
.018
.388
.191
,894
,534
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TABLE 7
Mean Buying Intentions Score
MODE DECISION INVOLVEMENT
Audio
Print
Total
High
3.69
4.12
3.92
Low
3.45
4.60
4.01
Total
3.57
4.36
Analysis of Variance: Buying Intentions
Source MS
MODE 14.45
INVOLVEMENT 3.08
INTERACTION .35
ERROR 3.39
4.25
.91
.10
.042
.343
.747
\ -.J\
.
MODE
Audio
Print
Total
Table 8
Two-Mediator Weighted Integrative Index
High
-1.625
•1.00
•1.30
DECISION INVOLVRMRWT
h°E Total
1.65
1.325
.16
•1.64
.16
Source
Analysis of Variance: Two-Mediator Index
MS
MODE
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT
INTERACTION
ERROR
129.6
52.9
55.2
26.9
4.82
1.97
2.05
.03
.16
.15
;: i:i
:
TABLE 9
Three-Mediator Weighted Integrative Index
MODE
Audio
Print
Total
High
-1.82
•1.57
1.70
DECISION INVOLVEMENT
Low Total
•2.12
.65
.74
-1.97
-
.46
Analysis of Variance: Three-Mediator Weighted Index
Source MS
MODE 91.52
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT 37.18
INTERACTION 63.70
ERROR 30.55
2.99
1.21
2.08
.085
.270
.151
:
I :• : '
:ri-.
TABLE 10
Mean Unaided Recall Scores
MODE DECISION INVOLVEMENT
Audio
Print
Total
High
2.450
2.900
2.675
Low
2,225
2.375
2.300
Total
2.337
2.637
Analysis of Variance: Unaided Recall
Source SS df MS
MODE 3.600 1 3.600 1.692 .195
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT 5.625 1 5.625 2.64A .106
INTERACTION .900 1 .900 .423 .516
ERROR 331.850 156 2.167
..(
.
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TABLE 11
Mean Aided Recall Scores
MODE DECISION INVOLVEMENT
Audio
Print
Total
High
1.875
1.800
1.837
Low
1.900
1.675
1.787
Total
1.887
1.737
Analysis of Variance: Aided Recall Scores
Source SS df MS
MODE .900 1 .900 2.155 .144
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT .100 1 .100 .239 .625
INTERACTION .225 1 .225 .539 .464
ERROR 65 .150 156 .417

TABLE 12
"Advertising -Originated" Cognitions
MODE DECISION INVOLVEMENT
Audio
Print
Total
High
.175
.425
.300
Low
.150
.775
.462
Total
.162
,600
Analysis of Variance: Advertising-Originated Cognitions
Source MS
MODE 7.65
DECISION
INVOLVEMENT 1.05
INTERACTION 1.40
ERROR .89
8.55
1.18
1.57
.004
.279
.212
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